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Price and Environment in Electricity Restructuring
1. Introduction
1.1 Motives for restructuring
Electricity restructuring involves taking power away from monopolists and regulators and
giving it to markets.  Traditionally the planning of the electrical system and its operation have
been the responsibility of regulated integrated utilities that generated, transmitted and distributed
the electricity.  Restructuring involves at a minimum eliminating the statutory monopoly on
generation and allowing competition in generation as well as requiring the transmission owner to
transmit power from generators to their customers.  It may go further and establish a competitive
wholesale power pool that sets an hourly (more or less) spot price.  It may require integrated
utilities to divest some of their assets; owners of the transmission and distribution networks,
which remain natural monopolies, may be precluded from engaging in competitive activities such
as generation and retailing.  At the retail level, the distribution utility may retain a monopoly over
the supply of electricity to customers in its service area, in which case it will purchase power on
their behalf under contract and on the spot market, overseen by a regulator.  Alternatively retail
competition, also called retail access, may be mandated, allowing competitive retailers to arrange
price terms with customers, paying the distributor for delivering the power.
The wave of electricity system restructuring during the last decade has been stimulated by
several forces.  The development of new generation technology, the combined cycle gas turbine
(CCGT) has greatly reduced the minimum efficient scale of a generating plant, allowing large
electricity consumers to install their own generation and facilitating generation by non-utility
generators.  The development of new metering technology and the information technology
infrastructure to communicate prices and consumption at low cost has facilitated competition in
metering and providing load-management services to consumers.  While these technologies
facilitate restructuring, however, Joskow (1997, p. 123) argues that the primary driver for
restructuring has been the high prices charged by regulated utilities in the 1990's as they recovered
the cost of investments in expensive facilities, when falling natural gas prices and increased
efficiency of CCGT plants reduced the cost of new generation.  Large customers rebelled at
paying 6 or 7 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to regulated utilities when the marginal cost of
wholesale electricity was 2.5 cents/kWh and long run marginal cost was 3-4 cents/kWh.  (Joskow,
1997, p. 126.)  The solution was to introduce competition in generation, dealing with the high
costs of incumbent utilities through an agreement on the amount of “stranded debt” that would be
recouped, and who would pay for it.  This seemed to be the logical next step after successfully
eliminating rate regulation and introducing competition for railroads, trucking, airlines, natural
gas, and long distance telephone rates from the late 1960's to the 1990's in the United States.
1.2 Experience with restructuring
By early 2001, the experience with restructuring was somewhat mixed.  In England and
Wales, generation costs fell dramatically after restructuring began in 1988, but this was the result
mostly of declining coal and gas prices and only partly from increased labour productivity and
improvements in the performance of nuclear plants.  Restructuring coincided with the North Sea
gas bubble, so there was a rash of CCGT construction.  However two firms own most mid-merit2 Electricity Restructuring
1  R.S.A., 2001, c. E-5.5.
(price-setting) plants (Wolfram, 1998, 706), and there was no retail competition for small
customers until at least 1998, so the reductions in generation costs raised profits of generators
much more than they lowered consumer prices.  In Victoria, Australia, a monopoly generator was
split into five one-plant firms, followed by similar divestment in four other states.  By 2001, there
were 17 generators competing in a national market, leading to improved plant utilization, better
reliability, lower costs and reduced prices to consumers.  In New Zealand a monopoly generator
was split into two principal firms and a market power mitigation agreement was imposed. 
Consumer prices for electricity fell about 20% between 1992 and 2000 and new capacity has been
constructed.
Alberta introduced the Electrical Utilities Act
1 in 1995 which adopted a mandatory power
pool and encouraged market participants to enter into side contracts, contracts for differences, to
hedge against price variations.  Apparently few did.  Despite steady economic growth, there was
no new investment in generation capacity pending the resolution of some market design issues. 
Spot prices on the Power Pool of Alberta rose as a supply crunch developed, and by late 1999
average prices had doubled from their 1996 values.  In 2000 they rose still further.  Consumers,
many of whom were paying spot prices, were furious at the price increases and accused the
Alberta government of bungling restructuring.  (Nikiforuk, 2001.)  In 2001, new generation plants
are being constructed, fuelled by both coal and gas.
Utilities in eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and eastern Maryland have for
decades coordinated electricity generation and transmission through PJM.  In 1997 and 1998,
PJM initiated a regional bid-based electricity market and established an independent system
operator handling about 8% of US electrical power.  The incumbent utilities remain in place, but
customers can choose their supplier and generation is competitive.  PJM adopted a nodal price
system in which prices between nodes on the transmission network could vary when congestion
limited flows between the nodes.  The market seems to be working smoothly.
The California power market opened in March, 1998, after eight years of economic
expansion during which no new generation was construction by the regulated public utilities
because of environmental and community opposition, although municipal utilities and non-utility
generators installed some capacity. After initial price drops, wholesale prices have skyrocketed,
propelled in part by air pollution emission limits.  A competition transition charge (CTC) equal to
the difference (positive or negative) between the wholesale price and a retail price cap agreed to
by the major stakeholders repaid some stranded debt when wholesale prices were low, but cost
distributors $10 billion in one year when wholesale prices rose in 2000.  The distributors’ financial
distress has led out-of-state suppliers to refuse to sell without secure payment.  Consumer prices
are being raised, the state is guaranteeing wholesale price payments, wholesale price caps have
been imposed and environmental standards are being suspended to unleash all available
generation. (Gallon, 2001.)  Some of the municipal utilities, which serve over 20 percent of
residential customers, opted out of restructuring for the time being, and those that are exporters
of power (including Los Angeles) are little impacted except for enjoying some refreshing
revenues.  San Diego completed its retirement of stranded debt during 2000, so its customers
were not covered by the price cap after that time, exposing them to spot prices and releasing their3 Electricity Restructuring
2  CCGT involves a gas turbine, like a jet engine, which turns a generator.  The exhaust
from the turbine is fed into a boiler which makes steam that powers a steam turbine and a second
generator.  While thermal plants often require as much as 10,000 Btu to make a kilowatt-hour of
wrath upon the California government which many accuse of bungling restructuring.
1.3 Questions
The brief histories above show that some restructuring appears to have brought broad
benefits while others have brought broad misery.  They may raise many questions, two of which
are addressed here:
1.  With costless metering, no transactions costs and no risk aversion, efficiency would call for all
customers to pay a price equal to the marginal cost of generation every hour of every day.  But
sophisticated meters are costly, marginal cost pricing imposes substantial financial risks on both
generators and customers, demand is relatively inelastic, and fixed prices are much easier to
understand and compare than variable prices.  Given these competing considerations, what would
efficient retail price plans look like?   Will markets find an efficient combination of spot prices and
risk management?  If not, is this the result of some artificial institutional barrier or is it an efficient
response to information costs, transactions costs and inelastic demands? 
2.  What effect do environmental regulations have on the performance of restructured electricity
markets?  Do particular types of environmental regulations raise electricity prices artificially
increased at times of peak demand?  How can the design of environmental regulations create
incentives for efficient control of pollution without artificially constraining electricity output?
To address these questions this paper will describe the central elements of electricity
systems and restructured electricity markets.  The analysis will draw on some of the experience
with selected restructurings to date.  Readers familiar with the electricity sector may wish to skip
section 2, which provides background information on this industry.
2.  Understanding Electricity Basics
Electricity cannot be stored; it must be generated exactly when it is consumed.  It can be
transported long distances, but long distance transmission capacity is limited.  These facts cause
electricity markets to differ substantially from markets for many commodities.  Understanding the
behaviour of electricity markets requires some understanding of the shape of electricity demand
and supply functions including the time variations of demand, of average and marginal cost
pricing, of investment in generation capacity, and of retail competition.  We will consider these
issues in a hypothetical electrical service area, such as a large metropolitan area.
2.1 Supply and Demand Elasticity
A typical service area will have three types of generation facilities: baseload, mid-merit
(medium cost), and peaking.  Baseload plants have high capital cost and low operating cost; they
can be nuclear, run-of-the-river hydroelectric, or coal-fired thermal plants.  Mid-merit plants have
moderate capital and operating costs; they are usually coal or oil-fired steam turbine plants, or
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT).
2  Peaking plants have low capital cost and high operating4 Electricity Restructuring
electricity, a new CCGT may require only 6,500 Btu/kWh.
cost, and often rely on a simple cycle gas turbine or storage hydroelectric power.  The aggregate
marginal cost curve for a typical fleet of plants has costs that rise slowly over a range of output
but rise rapidly as capacity is approached.  See SMC in Figure 1.  The marginal cost curve
becomes vertical at the capacity of the system.  If some of the capacity becomes unavailable, SMC
could shift up or left, for example to SMCN.  The mid-merit plants set the system marginal cost
much of the time; in a competitive market, they usually set the price.  Kahn (1988, p. 121) shows
the system marginal cost for PG&E in California around $42/Mwh in a summer night, and over
$60 during the day.
Empirical studies have found price elasticities of demand for electricity to be relatively
small in the short run and near unity in the long run.  Baughman, Joskow and Kamat (1979, pp.
52, 70) estimated own-price demand elasticities for the residential and commercial sectors at -
0.19 in the short run (one year) and -1.0 in the long run (20 years), while the corresponding
elasticities in the industrial sector were -0.11 in the short run and -1.28 in the long run.  Their
study, however, examined annual average electricity rates.  Ham, Mountain and Chan (1997, 132-
137) studied the response of small commercial customers (less than 50 kW peak demand) to very
short run price changes, looking at peak/off-peak time-of-use pricing in Ontario and found own-
price elasticities of -0.13 in the winter and -0.11 in the summer.  There was significant substitution
between peak and off-peak consumption only when the relative price ratio was as high as 6:1
between the two periods, and then the peak-period price elasticities were on the order of -0.067
to -0.091.  The responsiveness to price increases was greater for a 2-hour peak than for a four-
hour peak.
The existing studies of demand elasticity were conducted when many consumers had few
options for reducing consumption in the short run or for shifting it by a few hours from peak to
off-peak times, and when electricity prices had been relatively stable.  The elasticities should
increase with the development of improved load management technology, the expansion of load
management services by energy service companies, increased variability of prices, and improved
customer information regarding hourly prices and how to respond to them.  Still, we should
expect the price elasticity to be higher for within-day price variations as some customers shift
loads by up to 12 hours by storing heat or cold; lower for periods of a day to a year, since storage
is not useful for such periods, and higher as the time horizon expands beyond a year as new
capital equipment may be installed to conserve electricity or to switch to alternative fuels.
2.2 Average Cost Versus Marginal Cost Pricing: Contract Prices and Spot Prices
Most traditional electric utilities and most competitive electricity markets (but not
California) dispatch plants in merit order, which means they must know marginal generation costs
on an hourly (more or less) basis.  Some restructured markets use those marginal costs or bids by
generators to generate a wholesale spot price reflecting the price-setting bid for that hour.  If
market is competitive, this spot price should represent the short run marginal cost of generation. 
While analyses of some existing markets has revealed “gaming” that gives rise to prices greater
than marginal cost (Wolfram, 1998), and theoretical analysis has shown incentives to manipulate
prices (Newbery, 1998) we will assume a market structure in which these deviations are not large. 5 Electricity Restructuring
3  See monthly price data at www.pjmiso.com.
Economists’ enthusiasm for competitive markets arises from the use of this price to equate supply
and demand in real time; at every moment (or hour anyway) generators and consumers are
matching supply and demand at a market price.  At the margin, the cost of generation should
equal the value of consumption.  
Because electricity cannot be stored, and demand varies over time, marginal costs vary,
sometimes substantially.  Figure 1 shows a set of demand curves that may represent demand at
different times on a given system.  D1 could represent night time demand in the spring or fall,
when demand is at its lowest, while D3 could be weekday demand in the same season.  D2 could
be night time demand in the winter when heating loads are high, and D4 could be weekday winter
demand.  D5 could be summer weekday daytime demand in a hot climate.  And D6 could
represent an unusual peak demand.  The monthly average spot price in the PJM control area in
Pennsylvania was $16 per MWh in February, 1999 but more than $90 in July as the summer air
conditioning demand reached its peak.
3  The SMCN curve in Figure 1 represents supply when
some generation capacity is unavailable because of breakdown or maintenance or when fuel costs
for high-cost plants have increased, as we saw in 2000 when upward leaps in gas prices increased
generation costs for many utilities, most visibly in California.  Figure 1 shows that shifts in either
supply or demand may substantially increase or decrease the short run marginal cost, and thus the
efficient price, especially if the system is close to full capacity utilization.  In a competitive market,
the spot price will respond at once to these factors.
Charging customers the spot price is quite unlike the traditional practice of charging a
regulated price fixed for a period of a year or more to all customers in a class: a fixed price/kWh
at all times for small customers, a fixed price/kWh plus a demand charge for highest usage in the
billing period for medium users, and perhaps more sophisticated peak-load pricing for largest
customers.  Interruptible contracts, available to large customers, do not change the price, but
allow the utility to cut off the customer if a shortage of capacity emerges.
The spot price may be efficient but it can lead to variable electricity bills as was
dramatically demonstrated in Alberta in the year 2000 when persistent high spot prices doubled or
tripled normal electricity bills, with little relief expected until new capacity comes on line.  If the
utilities had still been under rate of return regulation, their cost-based prices would have barely
risen in 2000.  Whether the utility operates for 5% of the year on D5 or 10% of the year on D5
will only modestly affect total costs.  However if the price for all electricity generated in an hour
is set by the marginal cost of generation in that hour, spending 5% more time on D5 rather than
D4 can substantially increase the generator’s revenue and of course the customer’s cost.  With
marginal cost pricing, small shifts in supply or demand can substantially affect the load-weighted
marginal cost.
There are at least two general solutions to the volatility of electricity costs in competitive
markets.  One is for retailers or distributors to purchase a portfolio of electricity supply contracts
covering most of their customer demand and to charge consumers a price that blends the cost of
this portfolio and of the spot price for the remaining quantity.  If 80% of the supply is purchased
on contract, then the variability of the customer’s cost will be reduced by 80% from the variability6 Electricity Restructuring
4  One of the complaints about the California restructuring is that the distributors failed to
purchase power for their customers on long-term contracts and were therefore fully exposed to
spot prices. Some observers allege that the distributors were prohibited by the California PUC
from purchasing power at fixed prices for their customers, while the PUC argues that it was
willing to entertain proposals from the utilities for risk management, but few proposals were
submitted.  (Stavros, 2000.)
5  Many variations are possible.  Borenstein (2001, p. 12) proposes a system in which the
retailer would purchase 80% of the required power on fixed price contracts, but charge its interval
metered customers in any month the hourly price less the profit or loss that the retailer made
comparing his contract price with the average monthly price.  This leaves daily price variations
intact, but reduces by 80% the monthly variation in electricity cost.  However the customer’s
hourly price still does not equal the spot price.
6  Suppose that most customers normally consume 550 kWh per month; they would be
exposed to the spot price for only 9% of their consumption, and would be able to save at the spot
price rate until their consumption dropped below 500 kWh for the month.
of the spot price.
4  Unfortunately the marginal price paid by the customer no longer represents the
spot price but the blend of portfolio and spot price, losing much of the short-run efficiency of
marginal cost pricing.
5
 The other solution is for retailers or distributors to enter into contracts for fixed quantities
of electricity at fixed prices and to offer to consumers a price that is fixed for a specified quantity,
with deviations from that quantity bought or sold at the spot price.  Under this pricing
arrangement, consumers face the spot price at the margin, but they buy and sell relatively little at
that price so cost impact is modest.  This combines the efficiency of the spot price with cost and
revenue stability similar to that of rate-of-return regulation.  Interestingly, in the fall of 2000, the
California PUC guaranteed that residential customers of San Diego Gas & Electric would pay no
more than $75 per month for electricity in 2001 for the first 500 kWh per month; above that
usage they would pay market rates.  (Levesque, 2000, p. 14-15.)  This effectively gives those
customers a one-sided contract for 500 kWh per month; they pay spot prices for any excess
power consumption, but do not save at the spot rate if they use less.
6  This would provide a high
degree of cost protection while providing a full incentive for conservation at times of high prices.
2.3 Generation Investment
Regulated utilities, with their monopoly on generation, have traditionally forecast future
demand and planned investment in new capacity to meet it.  Plants are financed in anticipation of
regulatory approval for the rates to pay for them.  Indeed, one criticism of regulated utilities has
been over-investment in facilities to minimize risks of power shortages and consumer complaints. 
Investment planning is made more difficult by the long lead times to plan and construct generation
facilities: as much as a decade to construct a nuclear plant and as long again for environmental
and planning approvals; up to five years for coal plant construction and another five for approvals;
perhaps two years for construction of standard combined cycle gas turbine plants.  (Applied7 Electricity Restructuring
7  Gordon (1996) estimated the increased capital cost for conversion of Ontario Hydro
from a crown corporation to a private corporation.  However his analysis focussed on changes in
the capital structure and competitive costs of capital without regard to changes in the risks
inherent in the unbundling of generation, transmission and retailing activities, so actual increases
should greatly exceed his estimates.
8  “New power plants are being built in markets with regulated reserve requirements - like
NEPOOL - and in markets with no reserve requirements - like Texas and Western states.  They
are being built in regions with independent system operators, or ISOs, and in regions without
ISOs.  New power plants are even being built in markets with significant regulatory risk - like
California - or significant permitting and environmental hurdles - like the Northeast.”  (Seiple,
2000.)
Decision Analysis, 1983, p. S-2, 3-4.)
If the wholesale market is competitive, then private investors should be prepared to invest
in new generation when the forecast wholesale price will bring a satisfactory rate of return on that
investment.  However there is debate as to the willingness of investors in competitive generation
plants to face these uncertainties and long lead times unless they can sell most of the power under
long-term contracts.  In any event, such investments would likely attract risk premiums that would
increase with the lead time involved and increase with the fraction of the load that could not be
sold at a fixed price for a decade or two.  While it has been argued that competition will lower the
cost of new investment by forcing investors rather than customers to bear the costs of bad
investments, this argument ignores the increased risk premium those investors will demand for
bearing the risk. Thus capital costs for competitive generators must be substantially greater than
for a regulated utility making the same investment.
7  The experience in Australia, New Zealand,
and the UK shows that private investors will build new capacity under some market rules. 
Indeed, it has been argued that high prices have stimulated new construction in most markets,
even California, and that in 2000-2001 75,000 MW will be added to the US grid, more than was
added during all of the 1990's.
8  (Seiple, 2000; Rose, 2000.)
Investors need to know the rules so they can evaluate the investment.  Uncertainty delays
investment.  Yet restructuring takes time, during which the rules are, necessarily, unclear. 
Investment may stop when restructuring is proposed seriously and not resume until after market
rules are finally agreed, as in Alberta.  If this takes five years and the economy is growing, a
supply/demand crunch could emerge by market opening.  The smoothest openings of competitive
markets have coincided with excess supply, while the worst were those that opened with
shortages, as in Alberta and California.
If the new capacity is not small relative to the market, the price must rise above the target
price, since the new capacity will depress the price once it comes on line.  Over time, competitive
prices in a market in which capacity investment is not small relative to installed capacity may
follow a sawtooth pattern, rising until a new plant comes on line, then falling, only to rise again as
demand grows.
2.4 Retail Competition8 Electricity Restructuring
9  In Ontario, retailers were active in the summer of 2000 before the market opened, at
which time residential bills showed an electricity price that included transmission charges and
stranded debt charges.  Several professors of Economics signed offers, not realizing that the price
on the offer was more than 1 cent greater than the current commodity price.
10 Few Ontario residents are likely to have understood this clause in a recent residential
offer:
“In addition to the Price, the Applicant agrees to pay the Wholesaler the cost of any electricity that must be purchased by the Wholesaler to satisfy the
Applicant’s billing load profile should it differ from the utility’s billing load profile forecast and any incremental costs incurred by the Wholesaler as a
result of a failure to deliver by any of the Wholesaler’s suppliers.”
11  The MDC recommended that until its share of the generation market falls below 35%
Ontario Power Generation must refund to customers all revenues in excess of 3.8 cents per kWh. 
This allows the market price to vary hourly and daily with market supply and demand conditions,
but it removes any incentive for OPG to use its market power to manipulate the price above 3.8
cents.
Retail competition requires consumers to compare price offers from competing retailers
and choose intelligently among them.  Yet a competitive electricity bill will price separately
generation, transmission, distribution, billing and metering and other costs.  The customer may or
may not be able to match a quoted price to an existing line on a bill.
9  Customers may not read or
understand all of the terms of a contract that is offered.
10  They may have trouble comparing
offers of fixed prices to offers tied to a price index or with time-varying prices.  More generally,
experience has shown that small consumers have difficulty evaluating competing offers, and in
consequence do not switch unless they have some assurance of cost savings of 10% or more.
Because many customers will not choose a competitive retailer unless they are paying a
price significantly above the competitive level, it is important that they pay a fair price if they do
not choose a retailer.  One possibility would be to pass the spot price through to default (also
called standard supply)  customers.  This was recommended (narrowly, and after vigorous debate)
by the Ontario Market Design Committee (1998, RM 4-3).  It gives the small customer the full
advantage of the competitive wholesale price, without the costly intervention of middlemen.  This
seems like a reasonable proposition if one can expect the wholesale price to be reasonably stable,
as would be the case in the first few years of the Ontario market because of a wholesale revenue
cap for the legacy monopoly generator.
11  However the California and Alberta experience in 1999
and 2000 shows that the risks of high spot prices may be larger than even opponents of spot price
pass-through imagined, at least if the market is poorly designed or the opening date coincides with
a supply crunch.  
So, customers may demand protection from spot price volatility.  However, the
distribution utility is a regulated monopolist and risk-management is a competitive business.  Once
the distribution utility moves beyond simply passing the spot price through to customers a host of
problems arise.  If the distributor may lock customers into default supply, competition is seriously
constrained.  If they cannot be locked in, how does the distributor ensure that customers will not
depart when the spot price is low and return when it is high?  How can the distributor purchase a
portfolio of supply contracts for a customer base that may shift with the vagaries of the market? 9 Electricity Restructuring
12  Joskow and Schmalensee (1983, p. 81) suggest that as a general principle “prices
should reflect marginal costs, taking appropriate account of metering costs and other contractual
complexities.”
Yet the distributor that does not match its default load with power purchases risks the financial
ruin that has rained down upon several imperfectly hedged firms in commodity markets in recent
years.  It is not certain that conservative local wires companies whose main duty is to keep the
wires in good repair and send out accurate bills on time will be proficient in managing complex
risk management systems.  Restructuring jurisdictions have struggled with the competing goals of
stable consumer prices and low-risk distribution utilities which leave risk-management to
competitive retailers without converging on any wholly satisfactory solution.
3. Will Restructuring Lead to Efficient Prices?
3.1 Efficient pricing
Basic price theory says that when firms are price-takers they will adjust their output until
price equals marginal cost, while price-taking consumers will adjust their consumption until the
marginal value of another unit just equals the price.  These two conditions ensure that consumer
surplus and producer surplus are maximized, at least when there are no externalities and the
commodity is homogeneous.  Therefore marginal cost pricing should achieve efficient electricity
production and consumption in the absence of transactions costs.  (Joskow and Schmalensee,
1983, p. 81.)  If consumers face a price not equal to marginal cost, there is a welfare loss equal to
the Harberger triangle, and a transfer equal to the rectangle.  See Figure 2.  So, one test of any
electricity market is its ability to transmit efficient marginal cost prices to consumers.
There are, however, competing considerations.  First, it is more costly to meter electricity
use by the hour than by the month.  Second, risk-averse customers will want protection from price
volatility, not because of short-term price spikes but because of the risk of prices that stay high
enough long enough to substantially raise their monthly bills.  Third, the complexity of anything
other than fixed prices imposes costs on consumers to understand the price system so they can
compare competing offers and so that they can respond efficiently.  These factors mean that
efficient pricing must involve minimizing the sum of lost consumer and producer surplus from
mis-pricing plus the cost of metering and billing, the cost of risk-bearing, and the cost of
understanding the price system.
12
We can consider the efficiency of electricity pricing over several time frames.  The very
short run would examine the transmission of hourly prices and evaluate the responses of
customers to changes in those prices.  The short run would examine prices over a period such as a
month during which time customers unable to respond to hourly prices could still respond to
prices determined on a monthly or billing period basis.  The medium run would examine the same
issue over a year, which would allow customers to make some investment in energy conservation
or energy management equipment or practices.  The long run would examine prices over a period
of several years during which customers could invest in demand management technology or
strategies, and generators could invest in new capacity.
The evaluation of electricity pricing plans would therefore require some assumption about10 Electricity Restructuring
the pattern of variations in marginal cost over some defined scenarios.  The scenarios should
include typical years in which capacity is adequate and prices follow predictable patterns as well
as plausible years in which capacity is short and unusual but not implausible price patterns are
observed.  While blackouts are rare in North America they do occur occasionally, and brownouts
are not uncommon.  To the extent that the risk of these events can be predicted, and to the extent
that they impose costs on consumers, conditions that could cause them to occur should be
included in the scenarios, to determine the extent to which various pricing plans can reduce
demand when supply is short and thereby reduce the costs associated with a brownout or
blackout.  Because service areas differ with respect to the portfolio of generation plants, such cost
variations would have to be determined specifically for the service area in question.  A model of
consumer demand would be needed for each customer class that would predict the demand
response to any price plan when implemented in any of the marginal cost scenarios.  The model
could calculate the welfare costs of any deviations in price from marginal cost.  The model would
also have to incorporate information about consumers’ and generators’ preferences regarding
price risk so that it could calculate welfare losses arising from price fluctuations.  Finally, some
means would have to be found to assess the costs to consumers of evaluating alternative price
plans as a function of their complexity and to predict the extent to which they will be able to
evaluate these alternatives satisfactorily.  
3.2 Regulated Prices
How does pricing by a regulated monopoly match the model of efficient pricing?  Joskow
and Schmalensee (1983, p. 88) state bluntly that wholesale and retail power prices “are currently
not generally based on marginal cost pricing principles.”   Regulated rates for small commercial
and residential consumers in the United States and Canada are usually fixed for a year or more at
a time in the form of block declining rates.  Reliance on a meter that measures only the cumulative
kWh used between readings, which are taken at intervals ranging from one to three months,
precludes changing the price to reflect short-run cost variations.  Medium and large size industrial
and commercial customers use a “demand” meter that records the kWh used and records the
maximum rate of use, in kilowatts (kW), between readings.  The customer pays both a kWh
charge and a demand charge for peak usage.  This is intended as a peak-load-pricing system,
although the customer’s peak may not coincide with the system peak.  The rates for kWh and kW
are fixed in advance for periods of a year of more.  The largest industrial customers, often
connected directly to the high-voltage transmission grid, generally use an interval meter that
records their electricity consumption every ten minutes or so.  They may pay a fixed price or a
price that varies with time.
Some jurisdictions also offer time-of-use (TOU) prices, especially in California which
required TOU pricing for large customers in the 1970's.  A TOU meter is really two or three kWh
meters together with power run through one or another meter at different times of day according
to a fixed schedule.  In Los Angeles, for example, the summer (May through September) peak
period is weekdays, 11AM to 6 PM, the semi-peak is weekdays 6AM to 11 AM and 6PM to
10PM.  All other times are off-peak.  In the winter, the peak moves to weekday evenings 5PM to
8 PM.  The TOU meter records cumulative kWh consumption in each period at the time of meter
reading.  The peak period price may be four times the off-peak price or even more.  The11 Electricity Restructuring
combination of TOU metering with seasonal price changes allows considerable flexibility to tailor
prices to expected marginal costs, but not to actual costs.  However, in the pre-restructuring
North America, only a small fraction of all customers were likely on TOU metering.
Regulated rates generally cover the average cost of all power generation over the period
for which the rates are set, usually a year or more.  Hourly, daily and seasonal variations in
marginal costs are lost in fixed annual rates.  They are partially lost in TOU rates.  There is no
reason for the average cost for the year to equal the load-weighted average of the marginal costs
for the year or the marginal costs of new generation capacity.  In short, the variability of system
marginal costs over time means that rate of return regulation will fail to transmit to customers the
true marginal cost of the power they consume at any time.  Joskow (1997, p. 126-7) reports that
in the mid-1990's, the regulated price of electricity generation in the US northeast and in
California was in the range of 6 to 7 cents/kWh, while the marginal cost of wholesale electricity
was about 2.5 cents/kWh and the long run marginal cost was between 3 and 4 cents.  In 2000, the
marginal cost of wholesale electricity in California seemed to reach several times the regulated
price.
3.3 Pricing Alternatives
In wholesale markets with a competitive structure and spot price, the hourly spot price
should reflect the marginal cost of the most expensive unit dispatched and thus the opportunity
cost of electricity for the hour.  To what extent will this price be passed on to customers?
To pay an hourly price, a customer must have “interval meter” that records the kWh used
in every hour of every day and transmits the data to the electricity supplier from time to time. 
While advancing technology has reduced cost of such meters and their reading, they still cost
more on an annual basis than a kWh meter. As the size of the customer’s consumption falls, the
potential savings from hourly metering will become too small to justify the cost of the more
expensive meter.  As a practical matter, most restructured markets have not required small
consumers (often defined as less than 50 kW peak demand), residential and commercial, to install
interval meters, and in those markets where such a meter is a prerequisite to signing up with a
competitive retailer that requirement has been regarded as a barrier to competition.  Restructuring
usually requires wholesale customers, including distributors and large industrial end users, to
replace demand meters with interval meters, and over time the maximum demand that need not
install interval metering is reduced. 
Whether it is economically desirable to install an interval meter and charge hourly prices
rather than using a kWh meter and charging monthly prices depends on the costs of installation
and operation and the welfare gains that arise from adjusting demand to the varying price.  If
short-run demand was completely inelastic, the welfare losses on the demand side from charging a
price not equal to marginal cost would remain, and the gains from interval metering would be
zero.  As a customer becomes more responsive to hourly prices, the welfare loss arising from not
facing the hourly price and adjusting quantity accordingly increases.  Suppose that the price
elasticity of demand in the very short run is -0.2, the marginal cost is 3 cents off-peak and 6 cents
on peak, and the small customer’s usage is 635 kWh per month on-peak and 365 kWh/month off
peak at a uniform price of 4.2 cents.  Changing this customer to a real-time pricing scheme would
decrease consumption modestly during the peak and increase it off-peak, eliminating a welfare12 Electricity Restructuring
13  The retailer and customer who is paying the spot price can enter into a contract for a
fixed quantity of electricity at a fixed price for a fixed period of time.  The contract will be settled
by payment by one party to the other of the difference between the spot price and the contract
price multiplied by the contract quantity.  This contract is an investment in the price of electricity. 
If the spot price exceeds the contract price, the customer wins.  If the spot price falls below the
contract price, the retailer wins.  The customer is exposed to the spot price of electricity for
marginal purchases because the payment under the contract is not affected by actual consumption. 
loss of about 1.6% of the total revenue for the month.  See Figure 2.  This is unlikely to be large
enough to justify the cost of interval metering compared to kWh metering for the smallest
customers such as individual households.  However the deadweight loss increases as the square of
the price deviation.  The PJM data referred to above suggest that the marginal cost in July, 1999
was triple the average marginal cost for the year of almost $30/mWh; if the marginal cost was
triple the price for a month, the deadweight loss could exceed 25% of the expenditure for the
month.  Thus the value of more accurate pricing may depend as much on the extent of large
deviations between marginal cost and price as on small routine deviations.  A full analysis of the
relative merit of different pricing systems would require a description of the anticipated variability
of hourly marginal costs and an estimate of the response of consumers to those prices and the
welfare loss associated with each pricing plan.
An intermediate step between the kWh meter and the interval meter is of course the TOU
meter.  The meter is more expensive than the kWh meter, but less costly than an interval meter.  It
is usually read manually, so it does not require a modem and telephone hookup.  It allows pricing
that varies according to pre-set periods of the day and that may vary by season.  
Let us assume that the customers for whom interval metering is not justified will use either
kWh meters or TOU meters and that the meter will be read every two months.  Can we find a
pricing scheme better than to charge a fixed annual price equal to the expected average cost of
generation, or even the expected marginal cost of generation (the expected spot price)?  There
may be substantial changes in the weighted marginal cost of generation (spot price) among these
bimonthly periods that could be captured in a pricing system.  In many service areas the weighted
bi-monthly average spot price varies significantly throughout the year.  It is higher when demand
is high because of cooling demands in the summer (especially in the south) and heating demands
in the winter (especially in the north).  It is lower in the in spring and fall when heating and
cooling demands are modest.  In jurisdictions with substantial hydroelectric generation prices may
be especially low when river flow is at its maximum.  One could capture the normal seasonal
variation in price for small customers simply by varying the kWh price seasonally.  Philadelphia
has higher prices during the summer (June-September) than during the winter.  As a seasonal
pricing system would cost little more to administer than annual pricing, we should expect to see it
in use where there are significant and predictable seasonal variations in the marginal cost of
generation and non-trivial consumer responses to those seasonal variations.
We could imagine a range of pricing systems from a price that is fixed for a multi-year
period, say five years, to a price that varies hourly with the spot price.  When the customer pays
the spot price we assume that they can also hedge the price risk by purchasing a futures contract
for a fixed amount of power at a fixed price, or contract for differences (CFD).
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If consumption exactly equals the contract amount, the customer’s cost is just the contract cost. 
If consumption exceeds the contract amount, the customer pays the spot price for each additional
kWh.  If consumption falls short of the contract amount, the customer is reimbursed at the spot
price for each kWh of shortfall in consumption.
14  Borenstein (2001, p. 8) reports empirical analysis showing that on average purchasers
under forward contracts will not pay less than the expected spot price.
set of possible pricing plans.  The first is a price fixed for five years covering all of the customer’s
electricity requirements.  In a competitive market, the retailer should set this price at the weighted
average expected spot price, where the expected price in every hour is weighted by the
customer’s expected consumption in that hour, plus a premium to compensate the retailer for
administrative costs and for bearing the risks of unforseen spot price fluctuations and of variations
in the customer’s consumption.
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The second price plan is a fixed price for one year.  The risk premium should be lower
than for the 5-year contract because the customer assumes the risk of year-to-year price
fluctuations so the retailer makes his forecast over a much shorter period of time.  The welfare
loss is less since the price can adjust every year, but the customer’s volatility is higher for the
same reason.
The third price plan is a seasonal plan, set somewhat in advance of the beginning of the
year, like plan 2.  It differs in that the price varies between seasons in accordance with the
expected seasonal variation in the spot price.  This plan transmits predictable seasonal prices to
the consumer, encouraging conservation in the high price periods.  To the extent that seasonal
variations in the spot price can be predicted before the start of the year, this plan can capture
them.  Consumer and producer surplus losses are somewhat reduced from plan three, but
volatility is no greater since prices are known at the beginning of the year.
The fourth price plan is a TOU plan, set in advance like plan 2.  The price in each period:
peak, semi-peak, off-peak, is set in accordance with the expected variation in the spot price.  This
plan transmits predictable prices to the consumer, encouraging conservation in high-price periods. 
Like plan 2, it works as well as our ability to forecast expected prices, but its performance
degrades if the spot prices vary considerably even within the specified periods.
Plans 2, 3 and 4 would not have helped California deal with the supply/demand imbalance
during 2000 because the very high prices of the summer and fall were not anticipated late in 1999. 
To reduce the welfare losses associated with unexpected shortages and price spikes, and to
actually reduce the peak prices through demand response would require a system in which the
price was based on actual realized spot prices, or real-time pricing as it is sometimes called.  Plan
5 would compute the customer’s bimonthly bill based on the customer’s usage and the weighted
average spot price during the two months.  In this system, customers would not know the price
until the end of the billing period, although it would be possible to forecast the price at the
beginning of every billing period and news reports and retailers could inform consumers of
expected daily prices so they could adjust their consumption accordingly.  Such a pricing system
would probably achieve much of the demand response that could be achieved by hourly pricing, at
least for small customers, yet it would not require expensive interval meters.  It would expose the14 Electricity Restructuring
customer to the full variability of the spot price.  This is essentially the price plan recommended by
Ontario’s Market Design Committee for customers who do not choose competitive retailers. 
(MDC, 1998, p. 4-5.)
While price volatility has been modest in some competitive systems, the California and
Alberta price leaps in 2000 have been unpopular with those who face the spot price without
hedging.  Moreover it is possible that competitive investment may lead to smaller capacity
reserves than a monopolist would provide, which would cause demand to intersect the sharply
rising portion of the supply curve more often, increasing the volatility of prices beyond what
would be predicted using the monopoly data.  This concern could be met by adding a price hedge
for the consumer in the form of a contract for differences (CFD) for a period of one to five years,
shown in plan 6.  We assume that the customer’s normal consumption is 600 kWh per month and
that the CFD covers 500 kWh per month.  The customer is therefore exposed to the annual price
for his marginal consumption, but the volatility of his electricity costs are 83 percent hedged, so
his cost variability is only 17 percent of the variability of plan 5.  On the assumption that the
customer responds to increasing prices by reducing her consumption, the cost variability is less
than 17 percent.
Why might the assumed CFD cover less than the full anticipated demand?  In principle, it
could cover the average customer’s expected demand.  However if the customer should draw less
power than the amount of the CFD, and if the annual price is less than the CFD price, the
customer will pay an apparent penalty because s/he is effectively buying the excess of the contract
consumption over actual consumption at the CFD price and selling at the lower spot price. 
Customers will be unhappy enough at discovering that their contract price is above the spot price
without the further insult of having to pay the contract premium for any electricity they did not
consume.  I therefore assume that customer satisfaction will be improved by a hedge that covers
less than normal consumption so that the customer always pays more when the spot price is high
and less when the spot price is low.
Plan 7 requires the customer to install an interval meter and passes the spot price to the
customer on an hourly basis.  It differs from plan 5 only in that the customer pays for actual
hourly usage multiplied by actual hourly spot prices rather than using a load profile to allocate the
customer’s bimonthly usage to the hourly spot prices.  Price volatility is the same for both plans,
since billing is bimonthly.  Indeed, effective price volatility could be slightly less under plan 7 than
under 5 because the customer could reduce consumption during the highest-price hours and
thereby escape the effect of the worst price spikes under plan 7.  As with plan 5, the customer
under plan 7 might purchase a CFD for any period from one to five years to hedge the spot price
volatility.
The rate plans in Table 1 might be offered to any customer of any size, although plans 7
and 8 are unlikely to be attractive to small customers.  To be certain about the relative merits of
the plans would require analysis of the type suggested in section 3.1 above.  However intuition
suggests that since plan 6 requires no more sophisticated metering than plan 1, greatly reduces the
welfare losses from plan 1 and increases volatility only modestly, plan 6 might be preferred by
customers too small for interval metering, but who have a significant ability to vary their
consumption in response to price.  Plan 8 should be preferred by customers large enough to justify
an interval meter.15 Electricity Restructuring
15  Direct Energy Marketing Limited solicited residential customers in Toronto in 2000
with a price offer of 5.75 cents/hWh for electricity for five years, with a 10 percent discount in the
first year and a penalty for cancellation equal to 1.5 cents per kWh for the customer’s forecast
consumption over the remainder of the five years.  Toronto Hydro Energy Services Inc. solicited
residential customers with a price offer of 5.65 cents/kWh for electricity for one year, allowing
cancellation with 30-days notice.  Direct Energy Marketing limited solicited commercial
customers in Toronto with an offer for five years equal to the local distributor’s 2000 price less
half the difference between that price and Direct Energy’s acquisition cost plus a cost pass-
through of up to one cent for costs of aggregation, risk management, etc. paid to an affiliate of
Direct Energy.  Both Direct Energy offers provide that the customer bears the risk of additional
costs caused by the default of a supplier to Direct Energy.
3.4 Pricing after Restructuring
In many restructured jurisdictions, the regulated default or standard service price plan is a
fixed price for a year or so, representing plan 2, and in some cases price caps have effectively
provided fixed prices promised for several years, like plan 1.  Some jurisdictions have actually
passed through the spot price to default customers, averaged over their billing period if they do
not have an interval meter.  This represents plan 5 for small customers or plan 7 for large
customers.  That any jurisdiction would use plans 5 and 7 for default supply is encouraging,
although when prices rose in Alberta, the government stepped in with subsidies that converted
spot prices to fixed prices for many consumers.  In California, retail prices were capped at
$60/Mwh, so prices that could in theory fluctuate with the spot price in real time were fixed at
that price until the stranded debt was paid off. In fact, the regulated default pricing in many
restructured jurisdictions is not obviously very different from what existed before restructuring. 
This should not be surprising since the same public utility commission is still regulating the same
distribution utility as before.
Retailers in competitive markets appear to offer small customers fixed price contracts for a
period of a year or so.  The solicitation of residential customers in Ontario in 2000/01 has offered
fixed price contracts for one or five years, representing plans 1 and 2, although commercial
solicitation has offered a five-year price that would split the difference between the price in the
year 2000 and the retailer’s cost of acquisition.
15  Borenstein (2001, pp. 10-11) suggests that real-
time pricing for retail customers of all sizes is rare. 
Large industrial customers can afford to hire experts to manage their consumption and to
optimize their equipment and operations to minimize their power bills.  Thus the welfare gains
from exposing large customers to the spot price should be greater than for small customers.  
Unfortunately there is little information available on the contracts faced by large customers in
competitive markets because most contracts are bilateral and confidential.  Even in a jurisdiction
in which large customers pay the spot price, they may enter into CFD contracts with generators or
retailers that reduce the expenditure risk even if it exposes them to the spot price on the margin. 
Many participants in the MDC process in Ontario were hostile to the concept of CFD’s and
argued instead for “physical bilateral” contracts, the nature of which was unclear.  If medium and
large customers contract for power at a fixed price regardless of quantity then the gains from
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customers who paid spot prices did not purchase CFDs and were therefore on plans 5 or 7,
exposed to the full force of the price increases of 1999 and 2000.  In California, the distribution
utilities generally did not purchase hedges against changes in the wholesale price, leading to the
fiscal immolation of 2000.
The research agenda that this suggests is to survey the pricing arrangements offered to
default customers in restructured electricity markets, along with the contractual arrangements
offered by retailers in those markets.  Those plans, along with any of the hypothetical plans from
Table 1, could then be evaluated by the model suggested in Section 3.1 above to determine the
extent to which the market behaviour maximizes welfare calculated by the model assuming low
transactions costs.  If there are substantial divergences, further investigation could be undertaken
to determine whether there are institutional barriers to offering seemingly more efficient plans.  In
addition, it might be possible to determine whether the price plans offered to default customers
achieve the right balance between maximizing welfare and avoiding competitive activity by the
distribution utility.
Pricing in electricity markets might be compared to pricing in markets for other
commodities or services that cannot be stored.  The default long distance telephone prices are
fixed peak load rates, set for a year or more, but differing by time of day and week.  This
corresponds roughly to plan 4 in Table 1.  Competitive suppliers of long distance telephone
service offer plans some of which are flat rate at all times, and others of which vary by time of day
and week, mirroring the default rate.  None are responsive to actual conditions at all, despite
precise metering of every call and the fact that there is some congestion on the long distance
system at some times.  Commuter railroads often offer off-peak fare discounts during mid-day and
weekends, again with no responsiveness to real-time demand conditions.  Airline fares effectively
vary by time of day, day of week and season, as the proportion of low cost fares varies with
demand; it is easier to find low cost seats on Wednesday at midday, or on Saturday than on
Sunday evening, Friday evening or Monday morning.  Natural gas prices for residential consumers
can vary with market conditions, and as spot gas prices have risen during 2000 and 2001, many
consumers have faced increased residential bills as distributors pass through their increased gas
costs.
In summary, marginal electricity cost varies hourly, seasonally, and yearly.  Regulated
prices generally suppress all of this variability.  Competitive markets have generally produced
price plans similar to those that existed before restructuring, with customers rarely exposed to the
spot price on the margin.  Where customers are exposed to the spot price, there has been little
hedging of the price risk.  When prices are stable, these price plans may cause little welfare loss. 
In troubled times, however, large losses may arise from the failure to pass through marginal cost
prices, and even larger losses may arise from passing through such prices in the absence of
hedging.  Quantitative analysis is necessary to determine whether existing markets have exhausted
the gains from efficient pricing that could flow from restructuring.
3.5 The Role of Price Caps
California was not alone in imposing caps on retail prices when the market opened; several
jurisdictions have capped prices or promised consumers that prices would fall.  Economists have
argued that the California price cap is inefficient and that the resulting problems were inevitable. 17 Electricity Restructuring
Why, then were they imposed?  Joskow (2001, p. 7) says that when the price cap of $60/Mwh
was set in 1996, it was expected that wholesale prices would average about $30/Mwh, so the cap
was not expected to be binding. Indeed, in June, of 1998, just three months after the California
market opened, the president of PG&E told a western economic conference that in addition to the
10 percent rate decrease for residential and small commercial customers that the state imposed
effective January 1, 1998, “[b]y the end of 2001, we anticipate rates will decline at least another
10% to 20%.”  (Bilas, et al. 1999, p. 10.)  But if prices will decline without caps, and caps will be
damaging if they become effective, why do it? 
Politically, the a price cap may act as a form of commitment in a restructuring package.  If
industry and government are in favour of restructuring, small consumers may be wary of it,
worrying that they will not be well represented in the design process and may therefore lose out. 
If industry and government agree to price caps, this provides some assurance that the promised
price reductions will indeed emerge.  Indeed, it shifts the price risk of restructuring from small
consumers to the electricity industry, with the exact locus of its residence depending on the design
of the market. 
The experience in California reminds us of the danger of promises that will be inefficient if
they are effective.  The distribution utilities in California were completely exposed to wholesale
prices rising above the retail cap, and lost over $10 billion in one year as a result, impairing their
credit and their ability to purchase power just when they needed it most.  Moreover consumers
were protected from high prices and thus not financially encouraged to conserve electricity,
increasing the risk of brownouts and blackouts. This suggests a need to search for methods of
commitment that will not be disastrous if they are called into action, or market designs that ensure
that the commitment will not be called on.  The alternative recommended by the Ontario Market
Design Committee is a wholesale revenue cap imposed on the incumbent generator until the
market structure becomes competitive.  The revenue cap allows generation to be bid at marginal
cost, but if average revenue exceeds the cap during a year, customers receive a rebate for the
difference.  This allows the hourly price to vary with marginal cost, but limits the total bill that
consumers will pay over the course of the year.  Another alternative, imposed in San Diego, is a
price cap applied to a fixed quantity of electricity, with any further consumption paid at the
market price.  This encourages conservation, but protects those whose consumption is modest
from price increases.
4.  What Do Environmental Regulations Do to Restructured Markets?
It has been recognized that environmental regulations that were written specifically for
integrated electric utilities may have to be amended to deal fairly and efficiently with a variety of
types of generator (Dewees, 1996) and that demand side management programs that monopoly
utilities have funded would likely not survive in a competitive market.  These observations, while
correct, turn out to have missed several important interactions between environmental regulation
and the electricity sector which California, once again, has highlighted.  These interactions occur
in two distinct areas: environmental approvals of new generation plants and the regulation of
emissions from new and existing plants.18 Electricity Restructuring
4.1 Environmental Approval and Capacity Expansion
In most jurisdictions, the construction of new pollution sources requires environmental
approval resulting in the issuance of an environmental permit along with other approvals under
local zoning and/or planning laws.  Any fossil-fuelled generation will emit some air pollutants, it
may require water or cooling towers, and larger generation sites will require unsightly
transmission lines for connection to the transmission grid, so all but the smallest generation plants
will trigger an environmental approval process.  The environmental approval may only require the
issuance of a permit (in Ontario a Certificate of Approval under section 9 of the Ontario
Environmental Protection Act), or it may require an environmental assessment of the proposed
project, a detailed investigation that may require several years to complete.  The zoning/planning
approval may be straight forward if the proposed site is appropriately zoned, but it may be time
consuming and costly if rezoning or amendment of (or exemption from) an official plan is
required.  Either approval process may allow or require notice to the affected community and a an
opportunity for the community to comment or to question the proposal.  In practice, either
process may allow a project to be blocked if the political opposition is sufficient or if the
environmental or planning problems are sufficiently serious.
The purpose of environmental and planning approvals is to allow consideration of the
externalities associated with the project and an evaluation whether the externalities are warranted
or whether they can be reduced and then justified.  The approval process is designed to gather
data and evaluate it, and to reject projects that do not meet statutory and regulatory requirements. 
In principle such processes may be part of an efficient regulatory regime, so that the rejection of
some projects is consistent with the efficient control of externalities.  However if the process is
intended to balance costs and benefits of projects, however informally, to seek modification of
projects where the benefit-cost ratio can be improved, and to reject projects where the costs
exceed the benefits, the process must be designed so that it considers the relevant costs and
benefits.  In the case of electricity generation, the benefits of a project, in the form of lower
electricity prices, are likely felt over the entire area of the uncongested grid which is often a very
large area.  The social costs are often much more local: particulate pollution may be of greatest
concern within ten or twenty kilometres of the plant; the aesthetic concerns over power lines will
arise in a narrow strip starting at the plant; NOx emissions may also be of local concern; while
sulphur oxides and ozone arising from the NOx emissions may cause effects over many hundreds
of kilometres.  In general, those individuals bearing the costs and those reaping the benefits of the
project will overlap only partially.  This raises the risk that the approval process may not properly
balance all costs and benefits, leading either to rejection of projects whose net benefits exceed the
costs, or to allowing projects that benefit the general public but impose disproportionate costs on
a politically ineffective minority.  With possibilities of error in either direction, only a detailed
examination of a particular process or a particular project can determine whether the balance is
being properly weighed.
It has been suggested that California is in its present crisis, and would have been without
restructuring, because environmental opposition blocked major new generation projects by the
integrated utilities from 1990 to 2000.  Even if true, this would not prove that there is a defect in
the approvals processes in California.  Perhaps the environmental harm from all proposed projects
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anticipated from the construction of these projects would exceed the benefits of avoiding high
prices.  The recent public outrage over price increases that fell far short of covering marginal
costs during 2000 suggests but does not prove that if they had known how high prices would go,
Californians might have approved some of the rejected or postponed projects.  Designing a
process that would force decision-makers to balance the relevant costs and benefits would be a
daunting task.  However a first step to internalizing the externalities in the current California mess
might be to suggest that the current retail price caps would not apply in any area that rejected a
proposal for new generation capacity that met standard environmental requirements.  While this
would not accurately match costs and benefits, in a second-best world it might at least focus
debate on the inherent trade-offs.
More generally, any jurisdiction might evaluate its approval procedures to test whether
they are designed to identify the major costs and benefits of the project, to whomever they accrue,
and to balance them in a reasonable fashion, reflecting the values of the society.  A process that
achieves this goal and does so in a reasonably expeditious manner ought to allow the construction
of new generation in that is welfare-improving.  If the losses are concentrated on a particular
population, one might seek means of compensating the losers - perhaps a statutory tax reduction
or tax subsidy payment for properties within a specified distance of a high-voltage transmission
line or within the plume of greatest pollution from the stack.
What is the effect of an approvals process that slows or limits capacity expansion on the
price of electricity?  In a regulated monopoly, such restrictions reduce reserve capacity and may
ultimately create power shortages, brownouts, or even blackouts.  There is, however no
significant effect on price in the short run, although in the longer run new capacity will be more
expensive because of the cost of surmounting the approval hurdles.  In competitive market, the
reduction of reserve capacity will mean that demand curves intersect higher portions of the
marginal cost curve, driving the spot price higher.  This will create windfall gains for existing
generators and losses for unhedged consumers.  A competitive market will dramatically reveal the
worsening supply situation with price spikes of increasing severity and duration.  The extent of
this revelation on the revenue of generators and the expenses of consumers will depend on their
contractual arrangements and the degree of price hedging, but few are likely to be completely
unaffected.
4.2 Air Emission Regulations
Air emission regulations can have a significant effect on the average cost and the marginal
cost of operating a thermal electricity generation plant.  Equally important, the magnitude of these
effects depends on the form of the regulation as well as its extent.  Moreover a competitive
market will yield price changes in response to a given cost impact from environmental regulation
that is much greater than the price change that would emerge under rate regulation.  The effects
of environmental regulations on product prices were not given much attention prior to the price
explosion in California in 2000, except in astringent theoretical explorations (Baumol and Oates,
1998), but the revelation that limits on the emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) may have raised
the price of electricity in August, 2000 by as much as $50 per MWh (Joskow and Kahn, 2001, p.
16) compels attention to this issue now. 
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16  40CFR60.43a; Title 40 – Protection of the Environment, Chapter I – Environmental
Protection Agency, Part 60 – Standards of performance for New Stationary Sources, Subpart Da
– Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which Construction is
Commenced After September 18, 1978, Sec. 60.43a Standard for sulfur dioxide.
17  40CFR60.44a:  Title 40 – Protection of the Environment, Chapter I – Environmental
Protection Agency, Part 60 – Standards of performance for New Stationary Sources, Subpart Da
common practice of imposing more stringent emission limitations on new sources than are
imposed on old sources.  The second is the use of activity-based regulation, in which the amount
of pollution allowed is proportional to the activity level of the polluter.  The third is the use of
emissions trading and the difference between two types of emissions trading - allowance-based
systems, also known as cap-and-trade, and emission reduction credit, or ERC, systems.
4.2.1 The New/Old Distinction
Most air pollution regulation, in the US and in Canada distinguishes between new sources
and existing sources.  We adopt new source performance standards (NSPS) which must be met by
any new source constructed after the date of adoption of the NSPS, while existing sources are not
required to meet the NSPS and may only be required to meed some much less demanding
standard or may not be regulated at all. One effect of more stringent new source regulation is to
raise the cost of increasing capacity in the industry, thus raising product prices.  A second effect is
to delay the retirement of old sources.  The owner of an old source has, in effect, a permit to
pollute at a high rate, and gives up this right if it rebuilds or closes down the source.  If the
operating cost of an old dirty source is less than that of a new clean source, the imposition of
NSPS will encourage owners to extend the life of old plants.  (Hartman, Bozdogan, and Nadkarni
1979; Koch and Leone 1979.) In the electricity case the US NSPS for SO2 from utility boilers
was first set at 1.2 lbs/mmBtu in 1970, yet a quarter of a century later 263 generating units still
emitted more than 2.5 lbs/mmBtu.  (Ellerman, et al. 1997, 12.)
Under rate of return regulation, a utility is allowed to recover the actual costs of operating
its plant.  NSPS may mean that new plant is more costly than old plant, but the utility can only set
a price equal to the average of the old and new.  In a competitive market, if new sources are more
expensive than old, they will not be built until the market price will cover the full costs of the new
source.  Thus stringent NSPS should cause prices in a competitive electricity market in the long
run to be greater than those in an otherwise identical market subject to rate of return regulation.
4.2.2 Activity-Based Regulation
In the United States, the new source performance standards (NSPS) for coal-fired electric
power plants first enacted in 1970 limit sulfur dioxide emissions to 520 nanograms of pollutant
per Joule (ng/J) of heat input, equal to 1.2 pounds of SO2 per million British thermal units of fuel
heat input (lbs/mmBtu) with an added requirement that at least 70 or 90 percent of the SO2 be
removed from the stack gases.
16  The NSPS for nitrogen oxides limits emissions to values ranging
from 86 ng/J to 340 ng/J (0.2 to 0.8 lbs/mmBtu) depending on fuel type, with the highest limits
allocated to coal combustion.
17  Canadian federal guidelines for thermal power generation21 Electricity Restructuring
– Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which Construction is
Commenced After September 18, 1978, Sec. 60.44a Standard for nitrogen oxides.
18  Thermal Power Generation Emissions National Guidelines for New Stationary Sources
P.C. 1990-333.  The SO2 limit for coal-fired power plants is 258 ng/J (0.6 lbs/mmBtu) or 90
percent removal, whichever is greater.
19  Ontario Ministry of the Environment, “Guidelines for Emission Limits for Stationary
Combustion Turbines” (Toronto, MOE, March, 1994.)
emissions limit the discharge of nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide in
proportion to heat input.
18  Ontario’s guidelines for stationary combustion turbines limit nitrogen
oxides and sulfur dioxide in proportion to the power output of the turbine.
19  The common
threads in all of these regulations are that the allowable pollution discharge depends on the
amount of fuel burned and the type of fuel burned.  A source that burns coal may discharge more
air pollution per unit of heat in the fuel than a source that burns oil, while gas-fuelled generation is
allowed the least pollution discharge.  
The obvious effect of activity-based regulation is that an increase in economic activity
leads to an increase in total pollution discharge.  Every increase in the utilization of existing
generating facilities increases total air pollution.  Every new source commissioned increases the
total pollution discharge, unless the construction of new sources is constrained by non-attainment
of local air quality in the US.  If the emission limit was chosen such that the marginal cost of
pollution control was just equal to the marginal benefit of pollution control at some assumed level
of economic activity, it is unlikely that those conditions would still be fulfilled as the economy
grew.  More likely, as economic activity grows over time, and as technological progress reduces
the cost of pollution control over time, the efficient degree of control would become more strict.
A less obvious effect of activity-based regulation is that it fails to achieve the
environmental result at least cost.  Thomas (1980) and Helfand (1991) demonstrated that these
activity-based regulations are less efficient than regulations that limit total discharge directly.  The
intuition in the argument is that efficiency requires that the polluter experience, at the margin, a
marginal cost of abatement just equal to the harm caused by a marginal unit of discharge, and the
polluter’s product price should include the marginal private cost of production (including the cost
of pollution control) plus the marginal social harm caused by pollution discharge.  (Baumol and
Oates, 1988, ch. 4.)  If total discharge is limited absolutely, then to the polluter each unit of
discharge acquires an opportunity cost, which, in an efficient system, should be just equal the
marginal harm, so that the polluter’s marginal cost of production includes the shadow price of the
environmental discharge.  On the other hand, when an increase in output increases allowable
emissions, an expansion of output faces no such opportunity cost, since emissions may rise in
proportion to output.  The polluter’s private marginal cost of production is less than the social
cost, the price based on marginal cost is too low, and the good will be under-priced and over-
produced. 
This problem is compounded when, as is usually the case, the allowed discharge varies by
type of fuel.  Allowing more pollution discharge for coal-fired power plants than for gas-fired22 Electricity Restructuring
20  Federal Register, 51:233, December 4, 1986, pp. 43829-43859.
plants effectively subsidizes coal plants.
The inefficiency caused by activity-based environmental regulation is similar under rate-of-
return regulation and under competition because in both cases there is no actual expenditure for
added pollution control attendant on increased production and thus effectively no shadow price
on use of the environment.  In both cases, social costs will be understated and the electricity will
be under-priced.  In both cases, generators may be induced to use dirtier fuels.
4.2.3 Emissions Trading
Emissions trading allows firms to trade among themselves the right to pollute allocated by
a regulatory regime.  There are two basic types of emissions trading: allowance-based (cap-and-
trade), and emission reduction credits (ERCs).  Both are in use in the United States.  An ERC is
generated by reducing emissions below a regulated amount or historic baseline that is generally
defined as an emission rate proportional to an activity level in the polluting plant.  An allowance
system starts with a maximum emission rate for the industry, usually expressed in tonnes per unit
of time, and then allocates portions of this maximum to individual plants.  The crucial difference is
that with allowances the total allowed pollution emissions for the industry cannot increase with
economic activity in the industry while with ERCs emissions may increase in proportion to
industrial activity.  As it turns out, these two emissions trading systems have substantially different
effects on pollution emissions and on product prices.
Generally emissions trading is added to existing emission regulations rather than repealing
those regulations.  The continued existence of the old regulations helps to explain why trading has
not saved as much as initially expected.  Still, emissions trading can reduce the inefficiency of the
new/old distinction inherent in most regulatory systems, if the emissions trading is used to
substantially reduce total emissions.  If substantial emission reductions are mandated using
emissions trading, then the previous regulations will become less binding, and as the trading limit
is reduced, it should become the dominant force for pollution control, reducing the inefficiency of
the new/old distinction.
Emission Reduction Credits
Emission reduction credit trading was formalized in the EPA’s 1986 “Emissions Trading
Policy Statement” and the attached “Emissions Trading: Technical Issues Document.”
20  This
policy requires that emission reductions must be surplus, enforceable, permanent and quantifiable
to qualify as ERCs.  A permanent reduction is usually achieved by a change in technology that
reduces emissions per unit of activity but it may arise from reduced activity so long as the
reduction is made permanent by a revision of the source’s permit.  This means that a temporary
reduction in output arising from reduced demand for the product cannot create ERCs.  There are
many limits on trading, the most important of which is that ERCs may not be used to meet or
avoid new source performance standards.  The result of this policy is that an electric utility could
generate ERCs by installing pollution control equipment, permanently changing to a cleaner fuel,
or permanently reducing output, including closing down (Technical Issues, I.A.1.c.(2)), but not by
temporarily reducing output or substituting the output of clean generating station for that of a23 Electricity Restructuring
21  Draft Rules for Emission Reduction Trading in Ontario 1996, section 2.4.1.
22  Draft Rules, s. 2.10.
23  42 U.S. Code s. 7651.
pollution-intensive station.
A somewhat different ERC program, Pilot Emission Reduction Trading (PERT), was
developed in Canada by Ontario Hydro and other industrial, government and environmental
representatives.  Under PERT, ERCs can be created by “a specific and identifiable action or
undertaking which is not a mere change in activity level, (e.g. due to typical business
fluctuations).”
21  The quantity of ERCs created equals the activity level during the “creation
period” measured in product output, such as Mwh generated, or input, such as fuel consumed,
multiplied by the difference between the baseline emission rate and the creation period emission
rate.  PERT does not require that output reductions must be reflected in a change in the source’s
permit.  Moreover, it implicitly rejects ERCs arising from shutdown of the source, since creation
period activity would be zero.
22 
Because ERCs are based on activity-based regulations, they share all of the inefficiencies
of those regulations.  Even though firms can sell or buy ERCs, which creates an opportunity cost
for pollution discharge, the linkage of pollution to activity means that the opportunity cost is too
low.  Moreover the subsidy to dirty fuels remains.  Compared to an economically efficient regime,
the firms will tend to burn too much dirty fuel and will charge a price that fails to fully reflect the
marginal environmental harm from pollution discharge.  (Dewees, 2001.)  And, of course,
pollution emissions rise and fall with activity, growing over time as activity grows.
Cap and Trade - Allowances
The cap-and-trade or allowance-based system is a very different form of emissions trading. 
Here the agency or ministry sets the total allowable discharge for the region and industry, shares
of that total are distributed to the firms based on an allocation system that is independent of
ongoing firm activity, and the firms can trade these allowances among themselves.  Each year or
period the firm must report its emissions and retire valid allowances equal to the emissions. 
Typically allowances may be banked from one year to the next. 
The most prominent allowance trading program was established in 1990 by Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
23  Title IV lists the power plants and the quantity of SO2
allowances each should receive, based on 1985-87 fuel consumption and emission rates of 2.5
lbs/mmBtu for Phase I and 1.2 lbs/mmBtu for Phase II.  By the late 1990s, trading in the
allowances created by this program had reached substantial levels, and prices had converged and
stabilized.  Trading appears to have saved considerable costs of pollution control.  (Ellerman et al.
1997; Smith, Platt and Ellerman 1998.)
More recently, the RECLAIM program has used emission trading to control NOx and SO2
in the Los Angeles basin.  RECLAIM is an allowance-based trading system in which firms are
given allowances based on the product of activity levels in 1989-1992 multiplied by emission
factors for the current year.  (Klier, Mattoon, and Prager 1997.)  Pre-existing legislation provided24 Electricity Restructuring
for reductions in these emission factors over time.
Under an allowance based system, every ton of pollution discharged has an opportunity
cost because it could be banked for the future or sold to another firm.  The quantity of allowances
that a firm receives is independent of its current activity, so pollution is not subsidized by output. 
The quantity of allowances is also independent of the type of fuel burned, so there is no subsidy to
dirty fuels.  Dewees (2001) shows that an allowance-based system in a competitive market
achieves the efficient product price, assuming that the total allowed emissions are chosen at the
efficient level.  The marginal cost of generation under an allowance-based system is higher than
under an ERC system because increased output consumes valuable allowances.
Under rate-of-return regulation, firms that consume mostly allowances that they were
given for free (every allowance-based system distributes the allowances for free rather than
auctioning them as economists recommend) will spend little to purchase allowances and will
therefore fail to reflect the opportunity cost of allowances in its regulated rate.  Thus in a
jurisdiction that uses allowances to limit pollution discharge, a change from regulation to
competition in generation should lead to an increase in the price of electricity to reflect the
opportunity cost of the allowances.
Allowance Price Variability
The environmental stability of an allowance-based system can cause problems, as the
California experience has showed.  Suppose that you impose an emissions cap, based on equating
marginal benefits of abatement with marginal costs and assuming a particular demand for the
product and cost of abatement.  If demand grows more than expected, firms will be forced to
increase their degree of abatement, which could be quite expensive in the short run.  The price of
allowances could rise dramatically unless relieved by a stock of allowances in the bank.  Whether
this is desirable depends on the shape of the damage function.  Suppose that the harm caused by
pollution rose very steeply in the vicinity of the emission cap.  In this case, increased industry
activity causing sharp increases in abatement costs and product prices would be efficient because
little increase in pollution could be tolerated.  On the other hand, if marginal harm is constant over
a range of emission rates, having an allowance price that fluctuated with economic conditions
would be inefficient, failing to match marginal abatement costs to marginal benefits.
Again, California provides an instructive example.  Studies of the harm caused by NOx
emissions find values ranging from $220 to $9500 per ton (1992 US$) with an average of $2800.
(Matthews and Lave, 2000, Table 1.)   Let us assume that the California NOx limits were chosen
on the assumption of damages of $2,000 per ton or $1 per pound.  This is in line with estimates of
the cost of NOx control ranging from $1,500 to $2,500 per ton. (Farrell, Carter and Raufer, 1999,
p. 118.)  Joskow and Kahn (2001, p. 15) report that in early 2000, NOx allowances in the
RECLAIM area were selling for $1-2 per pound, equal to $2,000 to $4,000 per ton.  They also
report that the mid-merit gas-fired California generation plants emitted up to one pound of NOx
per Mwh, so that trading NOx allowances added perhaps $1 per Mwh to the price of electricity. 
During the summer, the price of these allowances rose to $10 in June and to $35 by late August. 
While I would not want to minimize the disutility of smog in the Los Angeles basin, one could
legitimately wonder if air quality was so damaging in August that it was worth $35 per pound, or
$70,000 per short ton to limit it.  It seems more likely that the price had in fact soared far above25 Electricity Restructuring
24  The principle has been proposed more recently regarding the design of global warming
policies.  Anticipating that countries may fail to meet their Kyoto emissions commitments, Ray
Kopp, Richard Morgenstern and William Pizer proposed that countries that fell short could either
buy permits on the market or pay a predetermined price per tonne of emissions.  See
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/features/parisconf0721/KMP-RFF-CIRED.pdf .
25 Joskow and Kahn (2001, p. 20) estimate that with existing controls, the difference in
electricity price between $10 NOx and $35 NOx would be about $35.  Assuming an hourly load
averaging 30,000 MW, this yields monthly consumption of 21.6 million Mwh.
any amount anticipated by the designers of RECLAIM and far above any reasonable estimate of
marginal harm.
No similar problem has arisen with the Title IV SO2 trading program for two reasons. 
First, because the SO2 problem is a long-distance long-term problem, trading covers the entire
continental United States.  While continental trading is inconsistent with some efficiency criteria,
since the continent is not a perfectly mixed airshed, the size of the market prevents regional shifts
in demand from greatly affecting prices, while banking provides further stability.  But the area of
southern California encompassed by RECLAIM is a relatively small economy and the electricity
generation discharges a substantial fraction of its NOx.  When the LA economy booms, demand
for NOx emissions will rise.  Second, banking is allowed from one year to the next under Title IV,
but not in RECLAIM.  With seasonal limits on NOx emissions and no banking substantial price
volatility is not unlikely.
Does this mean that allowance-based trading is inappropriate for regional pollution
control?  I would not like to abandon it given its superior efficiency characteristics over ERC
trading.  However the California experience reminds us that the design of a regulatory program
must pay careful attention to the true objective function and must allow for contingencies. 
Solutions to the problem have already been suggested in principle.  A quarter of a century ago,
Roberts and Spence (1976) proposed the use of a combination of quantity limits and an effluent
charge for exceeding the limits.
24  Suppose that the emission limit has been set appropriately and
that $1 per pound is a reasonable reflection of marginal harm most of the year.  Suppose further
that we think that marginal harm would double if total emissions increased by 25% and would rise
by an equal amount again if emissions increased by another 25%.  In that case, rather than keeping
the statutory limit as an absolute limit, we should be prepared to expand the limit if allowance
prices rise excessively.  If the price rises to $2 per pound, we should be prepared to sell an
additional 25% of allowances at $2 each.  We should be prepared to sell a further 25% at $3 if the
price should rise so high.  By offering to sell allowances in limited quantities at increasing prices,
we can try to match the shadow price of emissions to the marginal harm.  In the California case
there seems to be lots of room between $1 per pound and the $35 per pound price that was
reached last August for a compromise relief system.  If California had designed NOx emission




Marginal costs of electricity generation have always been quite variable in many
jurisdictions: hourly, seasonally, and annually, but these variations have been rendered invisible by
regulated average cost pricing.  In a regulated monopoly, a shortage of supply could lead to
brownouts or blackouts, implying a very high shadow price of power, but it would cause no price
increase.  There would consequently be little incentive to conserve or to prepare to conserve. 
Restructuring renders that cost variability visible.  As we see its magnitude, we should be more,
not less, interested in restructuring and in passing those price signals to customers so they can
respond appropriately.
The welfare losses associated with the blunt price signals of regulated monopoly prices
may be small during quiet times when capacity reserves are ample, but they may be large in a
supply crunch when demand approaches capacity and high cost generation must be run, or when
costly blackouts actually occur.  Welfare losses may be large when consumers who are paying low
prices demand capacity increases that involve costs per kWh substantially greater than the
prevailing price.
Electricity restructuring must create more volatile prices at the margin or it fails to do part
of the job of passing meaningful price signals to consumers.  But risk-averse customers do not
like highly variable bills and generators do not like highly variable revenues.  The design of
competitive markets must balance the desire for efficient prices and the desire for cost and
revenue stability.  There may be substantial welfare gains from reaching the appropriate balance. 
It has not been reached in markets where most customers are on either fixed prices or unhedged
and volatile spot prices.
Marginal cost pricing with modest bill volatility may be achieved by passing the spot price
to customers combined with a hedge in the form of a fixed price for a fixed quantity.  This can
utilize a contract for differences or other mechanisms.  The challenge is to embed these elements
into a reasonable system of retail competition and default or standard supply that the customer
can understand well enough to choose appropriately.
Electricity markets are not natural markets where we can tell the participants to act in their
self-interest and rely on natural forces to achieve efficient trades.  The complexity of electrical
systems provides myriad ways for market participants to impose externalities on each other, so an
efficient market requires myriad rules to minimize the externalities.  It is not yet obvious what
constitutes the best set of market rules.  California is not an example of how a good competitive
market works; rather it is a warning that poor design can involve failing to plan for plausible
contingencies and that poor design can be enormously costly.
Environmental regulations and limitations can significantly affect the marginal cost of
generation.  Competitive markets highlight the effects of those regulations and may require more
refinement in their design.  Restructuring allows the transmission of these opportunity costs to
consumers while regulated monopoly pricing does so much less effectively.  With restructuring,
the benefits of efficient market-based environmental regulations are increased, but the costs of
inefficient regulations, including poorly-designed market-based regulations, are also increased.
The California experience in 2000 reveals potential inefficiencies in emissions trading.  An
allowance-based emissions trading system is only efficient if the allowed emission rate balances
our concern for environmental harm and our concern for abatement costs.  If we use regional27 Electricity Restructuring
trading systems; if we prohibit banking of emissions from one season to another; if activity in the
polluting industry varies greatly from one season to another; then allowance prices may vary
widely from one season to another and industry output may be constrained.  Constraining the
output of electricity can be very costly.  Some relief should therefore be considered in the form of
additional allowances sold at increasing prices.  This flexibility will reduce spikes in the price of
allowances or of electricity arising from environmental limits, while incorporating environmental
damage in competitive electricity prices.  Electricity prices will signal the attractiveness of
environmentally friendly renewable energy, and reductions in emissions per kilowatt-hour of
generation will be encouraged.
What will competition do to prices?   Wholesale competition should lead to more efficient
generation, higher capital costs for new generation, investment in new capacity only when the
price will earn a reasonable rate of return on that new capital, and prices that are set by the
marginal cost of generation.  Since new generation is likely to be gas-fired CCGT, the price of
natural gas will be an important determinant of competitive electricity prices in many areas.  As
environmental regulations become more strict, including increasing limits on NOx emissions from
all thermal plants and limits on particulate and heavy metal emissions from coal-fired plants, there
will be upward pressures on costs and prices.  With all these factors, it is not clear that
competition will reduce electricity prices below historic prices.  It may not reduce prices below
those that would have arisen in the absence of markets if marginal costs happen to rise after
market opening.  Competition promises to reduce some costs by increasing efficiency, but it
promises to increase other costs by increasing risks and reflecting costs in prices.  It does not
promise lower prices; it only promises prices that better reflect true social and opportunity costs.28 Electricity Restructuring
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26  Assumed normal monthly consumption = 600 kWh.  CFD is for 500 kWh per month. 
Meter reading assumed to be bimonthly.  All plans require only kWh meter except #7, 8 which
require interval meter that records hourly consumption.
Table 1





1.  5-year fixed Expected average spot price, 5 years max 0
2. 1-year fixed Annual expected average spot price med-high medium
3. 1-year seasonal
fixed
Set annually at expected prices to
capture seasonal variations
medium medium
4.  1-year TOU fixed Set annually to reflect prices during 2-3




Set bimonthly ex post at actual average
spot
low high
6. – with CFD Same as 5, but with CFD for 1-5 years low 17% of high
7. Spot price Hourly prices, interval meter 0 high
8. – with CFD Same as 7, but with CFD for 1-5 years 0 17% of high
TOU time of use metering in which price can vary by time of day.
CFD contract for differences.  Assumes that the CFD covers 5/6 of usual consumption.32 Electricity Restructuring
Figure 1
Generation Cost and Demand33 Electricity Restructuring
Figure 2
Lost Consumer and Producer Surplus from Mis-Pricing
P* is the average-cost price set by the utility.
Off-peak demand DL is Q*L at P*.
Off-peak demand DL is QL at PL.
Peak demand DH is Q*H at P*.
Peak demand DH is QH at PH.
Welfare loss depends on elasticity of supply and demand.